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boundary between Bangladesh and Myanmar. The Judgment represents a landmark decision as the
Tribunal’s first maritime boundary delimitation case, the first adjudication of a maritime boundary in Asia
and the first judicial delimitation of a maritime boundary for areas of “extended continental shelf”
seaward of the 200 nautical miles (nm) limit. Rather than review the Judgment in detail, this contribution
will highlight three notable, and to an extent potentially problematic, aspects of the decision: the approach
to delimitation adopted and treatment of islands; relevant circumstances applicable within and beyond
the 200nm limit; and, the creation of a so-called ‘grey area’.
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GREY CLOUDS OR CLEARER SKIES AHEAD?
IMPLICATIONS OF THE BAY OF BENGAL CASE
Clive Schofield*and Anastasia Telesetsky**

I. INTRODUCTION. – II. APPROACH TO DELIMITATION AND TREATMENT OF
ISLANDS. – III. DELIMITATION WITHIN AND BEYOND 200 NAUTICAL MILES
FROM THE COAST. – IV. THE “GREY AREA.” – V. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS

I. Introduction
On 14 March 2012, the International Tribunal on the Law of the Sea (ITLOS)
delimited a maritime boundary between Bangladesh and Myanmar.1 The Judgment represents
a landmark decision as the Tribunal’s first maritime boundary delimitation case, the first
adjudication of a maritime boundary in Asia and the first judicial delimitation of a maritime
boundary for areas of “extended continental shelf” seaward of the 200 nautical miles (nm)
limit. 2 Rather than review the Judgment in detail, this contribution will highlight three
notable, and to an extent potentially problematic, aspects of the decision: the approach to
delimitation adopted and treatment of islands; relevant circumstances applicable within and
beyond the 200nm limit; and, the creation of a so-called ‘grey area’.
II. Approach to Delimitation and Treatment of Islands
The Tribunal determined that it held jurisdiction to delimit the maritime boundary
between the parties for the territorial sea, exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and continental
shelf, both within and beyond 200nm of the coast,3 and that the law applicable to such
delimitation was the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOSC), to which
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1
Dispute Concerning Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary between Bangladesh and Myanmar in the Bay of
Bengal (Bangladesh/Myanmar), International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS), Case no.16, Judgment,
14 March 2012, available at <http://www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/cases/case_no_16/1C16_Judgment_14_02_2012.pdf > [hereinafter Bay of Bengal Case].
2
The term “extended continental shelf” is employed in this article to indicate areas of continental shelf located
seawards of the 200nm limit.
3
Bay of Bengal Case, para. 50.
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both Bangladesh and Myanmar are States parties. 4 In this context, the presence of
Bangladesh’s St. Martin’s Island, just offshore the terminus of the two States land boundary
on the coast at the Naaf River, had potential implications for the delimitation of both the
territorial sea and continental shelf/EEZ boundaries between the parties (see Figure 1).
Regarding territorial sea delimitation, Myanmar pointed to the potentially distorting
effect of St. Martin’s Island on the definition of a median line because of its location
immediately off its coastline, arguing for a departure from such a line.5 Bangladesh, in
contrast, highlighted the island’s proximity (approximately 4.5nm) to the mainland coasts of
both States, its area (8km2), large permanent population (c.7,000 people) and significant
economic role, including the fact that the island is extensively cultivated and able to produce
“enough food to meet a significant proportion of the needs of its residents.”6 Bangladesh
therefore expressed the view that St. Martin’s Island should be accorded full effect on the
delimitation of the territorial sea.7 The Tribunal observed that while no “general rule” exists
in relation to the effect to be given to islands in the delimitation of maritime boundaries,8 in
light of its size, population and economic and other activities, there were “no compelling
reasons” to regard St. Martin’s Island as a special circumstance as argued by Myanmar. As a
result St. Martin’s Island was awarded full effect when it came to delimiting the territorial sea
boundary with an equidistance line constructed between normal baselines, thus producing a
delimitation line significantly closer to that proposed by Bangladesh rather than Myanmar
(see Figure 1).9

4

United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, December 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 [hereinafter
LOSC]. In particular Articles 15, 74, and 83 of LOSC being respectively concerned with delimitation of the
territorial sea, EEZ and continental shelf. See also, Bay of Bengal Case, paras. 46 and 54.
5
Bay of Bengal Case, paras. 131-133.
6
Id., para. 143.
7
Id., para. 141.
8
Id., paras. 147 and 317.
9
Id., paras. 147.
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Figure 1
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With respect to the delimitation of the continental shelf and EEZ, the Tribunal
decided that the equidistance/special circumstances approach constituted the appropriate
method for delimitation, and opted to apply the three-stage approach pioneered in the Black
Sea Case.10 Accordingly, the Tribunal first constructed a provisional boundary line based on
equidistance. 11 However, the provisional delimitation line so defined was not a strict
equidistance line as St. Martin’s island was excluded as a basepoint in its construction,
notwithstanding Bangladesh’s assertions that the island fulfils the criteria of Article 121(1) of
LOSC and should therefore be entitled to not only a 12nm territorial sea but also its own
continental shelf and EEZ.12 The Tribunal determined that as a consequence of the island’s
location “immediately in front of the mainland on Myanmar’s side of the Parties’ land
boundary”, use of the island as a basepoint “would result in a line that blocks the seaward
projection of Myanmar’s coast”, leading to “an unwarranted distortion of the delimitation
line.”13 This scenario was analogous to the Black Sea Case where the International Court of
Justice ruled that to use Serpents’ Island as a basepoint in the construction of the provisional
delimitation line would be tantamount to “a judicial refashioning of geography”,14 and this
decision was duly cited by the Tribunal in support of its treatment of St. Martin’s Island.15
This emerging trend towards selectivity in choice of basepoints prior to constructing the
provisional delimitation line is troubling. After all, to ignore certain potentially critical
basepoints itself represents a judicial refashioning of geography that serves to undermine the
clarity and consistency of the three-stage process.
An alternative option, and one that might be viewed as more rigorous, impartial and
methodologically systematic, would have been to draw the strict equidistance line including
all potential basepoints and then to adjust or modify the provisional delimitation line at the
second stage of the three-stage process. Such an adjustment could, in fact, have led to the
adjustment of a strict equidistance line so as to award St. Martin’s Island a nil effect, thereby
yielding the same result but in an arguably more logical and elegant manner.
10

Bay of Bengal Case, para. 240 (relying on Maritime Delimitation in the Black Sea (Romania v. Ukraine),
Judgment, 2009 I.C.J. 61 (Feb. 3) , available at <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/132/14987.pdf> [hereinafter
Black Sea Case], paras. 118-122.) (The three-step process comprises, first, the construction of a provisional
delimitation line based on equidistance, second, consideration of any factors that might lead to a modification of
the provisional line with a view to achieving an equitable result and, third, a (dis)proportionality test.)
11
Bay of Bengal Case, para. 240 and 271-274.
12
Id., para.142.
13
Id., para. 265.
14
Black Sea Case, para. 149.
15
Bay of Bengal Case, para. 265
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Nonetheless, it can be observed that the Tribunal’s treatment of St. Martin’s Island as
having nil effect at the first stage of the delimitation process is consistent with a growing
trend in the treatment of islands in the delimitation of maritime boundaries, especially those
that are small and sparsely inhabited or are located far from the coast or in such a manner as
to significantly and potentially inequitably impact on an equidistance line-based boundary.
This trend is welcome in that it tends to downplay the potential significance of the sort of
tiny, remote or problematically positioned insular features that are frequently the focus of
maritime disputes.
Subsequent to drawing the provisional delimitation line, the Tribunal proceeded to
determine whether there existed any reasons to adjust or modify that line in order to achieve
an equitable delimitation16 Bangladesh argued persuasively that the concave character of
Bangladesh’s coastline would mean that the application of strict equidistance line maritime
boundaries would result in its maritime entitlements being severely and inequitably
curtailed. 17 The Tribunal ruled that Bangladesh’s coast is “manifestly concave” 18 and
considered it appropriate to adjust the provisional equidistance line in such a way as to
relieve the resulting ‘cut off’ effect on Bangladesh’s maritime entitlements.19 It did so by
adjusting the equidistance line “at the point where it begins to cut off the seaward projection
of the Bangladesh coast”, considered to be from a point on the provisional delimitation line
due south of Kutubia Island where the Bangladeshi coastline makes an abrupt change in
direction, and then proceeding along a geodetic line with an azimuth of 215º (see Figure 2).20
The Tribunal offered no mathematical formula for such an adjustment.
Finally, a proportionality test was undertaken to ensure that the proposed delimitation
line was equitable.21 The Tribunal calculated the ratio of relevant coasts to be 1:1.42 in
favour of Myanmar with the ratio of maritime spaces allocated on the basis of the adjusted
delimitation line determined to be 1:1.54 in Myanmar’s favor.22 On comparing these ratios,
the Tribunal ruled that no significant disproportion between them existed, warranting further
adjustment of the delimitation line.23

16

Bay of Bengal Case, para. 275.
Id., paras. 279-287.
18
Id., para. 291.
19
Id., paras. 293-297.
20
Id., para. 334.
21
Id., para. 497.
22
Id, para. 498-499. Relevant coastal lengths and areas calculated to be 413km and 111,631km2 for Bangladesh,
and 587km and 171,832km2 for Myanmar.
23
Id.
17
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III. Delimitation Within and Beyond 200 Nautical Miles from the Coast
With respect to delimitation of the EEZ within 200nm of the coast, the Tribunal
rejected Bangladesh’s arguments based on geological and geomorphological factors and
particularly on the basis of the “Bengal depositional system” as a potential “special
circumstance”,24 on the grounds that delimitation of a single maritime boundary applicable to
both the seabed and subsoil and also to the superjacent water column should be delimited on
the basis of coastal geography rather than on the basis of the geology and geomorphology of
the seabed.25 The Tribunal therefore reasserted the primacy of arguments based on coastal
geography over natural prolongation within 200nm of the coast, essentially because the
geophysical factors inherent to the latter concept were applicable solely to continental shelf
and delimitation of both the seabed and water column was at issue.26 Seaward of the 200nm
limit, in delimiting extended continental shelf areas, the Tribunal once again rejected
arguments, including Bangladesh’s “most natural prolongation” claims, based on the
composition (geology) and shape (geomorphology) of the seabed.27 The Tribunal instead
ruled that, as there was only one continental shelf with no essential difference between those
parts of it within and seaward of the 200nm limit,28 the method of delimitation applied
within 200nm of the coast should also apply beyond that limit.29 Finding that the cut-off
effect produced by the marked concavity of Bangladesh’s coastline has “continuing effect”
beyond 200nm, the Tribunal opted to continue the delimitation line for the extended
continental shelf along the same 215º azimuth line relevant to the delimitation of the EEZ.30
While this approach has the allure of representing a crisp solution to a complex problem, the
treatment of geophysical arguments based on the natural prolongation concept within 200nm
of the coast and beyond that limit seems inconsistent and overly simplistic, especially in light
of the role of natural prolongation as a basis for entitlement to continental shelf rights and the
Tribunal’s own acknowledgement that the Bay of Bengal had been identified as a “unique
situation” at the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea. 31 Arguably,
therefore, geophysical factors could have been accorded more weight with respect to
delimitation of the extended continental shelf.

24

Bay of Bengal Case, para. 320.
Id., para. 322.
26
Id.
27
Id., para. 460.
28
Id., para. 449.
29
Id., para. 455.
30
Id., paras. 461-462.
31
Id., para. 444.
25
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Having satisfied itself regarding the potential impact of it exercising the jurisdiction to
delimit a maritime boundary beyond 200nm on both the rights of third parties32 and on the
Area,33 the Tribunal offered a detailed and sophisticated appraisal of the operative provisions
of Article 76. The Tribunal also provided a careful examination of its own role and also that
of the United Nations Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS). The
Tribunal was at pains to distinguish between them, ultimately concluding that there was no
tension between their distinct roles, thus allowing the Tribunal to proceed.34 The basis for the
Tribunal’s finding that there were overlapping entitlements to areas of extended continental
shelf for it to delimit in the Bay of Bengal35 were the apparently “uncontested scientific
evidence” of the parties on this issue.36 Given the parties’ own clear interests in this being the
case this might be viewed as a problematic basis for the Tribunal to proceed with
delimitation. Nonetheless, the Tribunal concluded that it was not only authorized to but
should do so.37
Entitlement over continental shelf areas can, however, only be confirmed through the
concerned coastal States delineating “final and binding” outer continental shelf limits on the
basis of recommendations from the CLCS.38 That the Tribunal did not make its extended
continental shelf delimitation strictly conditional on this process being fulfilled sets a
potentially problematic precedent for cases where there may not be comparable certainty
regarding the existence of extended continental shelf entitlements.39
IV. The “Grey Area”
Perhaps the most remarkable aspect of the Judgment is the Tribunal’s creation of a socalled “grey area”, measuring approximately 1,100km2, where continental shelf rights are

32

In the view of the Tribunal any decision it made “shall have no binding force except between the parties in
respect of that particular dispute”, in accordance with Article 33(2) of its Statute and thus have no impact on
third party rights and ruled that its delimitation line extends only “until it reaches the area where the rights of
third parties may be affected.” See id., paras. 367 and 462.
33
The Tribunal relied on the parties submissions related to extended continental shelf rights to conclude that the
continental shelf seawards of the 200nm limit to reach the view that the extended continental shelf areas subject
to delimitation in the case were “situated far from the area.” See id., para. 368.
34
See id., para. 373-394.
35
Id., para. 449.
36
See id., para. 411, 444, and 446. It can be observed that scientific evidence is rarely “uncontested”. However,
both Bangladesh and Myanmar were in agreement regarding the existence of extended continental shelf areas in
the Bay of Bengal and the Tribunal also referred to academic literature indicating the existence of some 1422km depth of sedimentary rock underlying the Bay of Bengal.
37
Id., paras. 363 and 394.
38
LOSC, Article 76(8).
39
The Tribunal did, however, note that its delimitation was “without prejudice to the establishment of the outer
limits of the continental shelf.” See id., para. 394.
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determined to belong to one of the parties (Bangladesh) but jurisdiction concerning the
overlying water column rest with the other party (Myanmar). This situation arises because of
the adjustment of the provisional boundary line. As a result, the grey area is located beyond
200nm from Bangladesh, and from the Bangladeshi perspective is an area of extended
continental shelf, yet is within 200nm of Myanmar (see Figure 2).
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Figure 2
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While innovative, the definition of the grey area arguably leaves the parties with
potentially contentious issues to resolve in the future, especially with respect to as yet
unresolved ocean governance arrangements. In this context, it is worth noting that the pivotal
event that led to this case being brought before ITLOS was the discovery of gas deposits in
the disputed regions, the unilateral authorization of exploration concessions by Myanmar in
2008, and the armed response by Bangladesh.40
The Tribunal, recognizing that this complex multi-jurisdictional scenario would need
to be addressed, noted that the legal regime of the continental shelf had always coexisted with
another legal regime in the same area41 and further observed that there are many ways for the
parties to protect jurisdictional interests, including “appropriate cooperative arrangements.”42
It is difficult to find fault with the Tribunal’s suggestion that maritime cooperation offers a
promising avenue to deal with the grey area. Indeed, many examples of such maritime
cooperation including maritime joint development agreements already exist in State practice.
Moreover, it is worth noting that differential jurisdiction over the seabed and water column is
not an entirely unique scenario, which offers some hope for a positive outcome. 43
Nonetheless, the Tribunal’s perspective may be overly-optimistic. After all, the parties
proved unable to resolve their differences over the delimitation of their maritime boundaries
despite many years of diplomatic effort. It is also notable that some Judges dissented from the
creation of the grey area. 44 Ultimately, the parties may be faced with a return to the
negotiating table in spite of their expectations for a final and binding resolution by ITLOS to
their maritime dispute.

40

See, for example, “Tensions Rise as Bangladesh Sends Another Warship”, November 5, 2008, available at
www.aseanaffairs.com.
41
Bay of Bengal Case, para. 475 (see, for example the high seas regime and, more recently, the EEZ regime).
42
Id., para. 476.
43
Treaty between the Government of Australia and the Government of the Republic of Indonesia establishing an
Exclusive Economic Zone Boundary and Certain Seabed Boundaries, 14 March 1997, available at
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/dfat/treaties/notinforce/1997/4.html (not in force); Torres Strait Treaty,
Treaty between Australia and the Independent State of Papua New Guinea concerning Sovereignty and
Maritime Boundaries in the area between the Two Countries, including the area known as Torres Strait and
Related Matters, 18 December 1978, (1985) 4 Australian Treaty Series.
44
For example, Judge Lucky advocated the prioritization of continental shelf rights over EEZ rights with a view
to the clear assignation of rights in the grey area to one or the other party so that the dispute would be fully
rather than conditionally resolved. See, Bay of Bengal Case, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Anthony Amos
Lucky, p. 2.
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V. Concluding Thoughts
Overall the Tribunal’s Judgment is to be warmly welcomed. Fundamentally, the
Tribunal’s decision, delimiting as it does maritime boundaries for multiple zones of
jurisdiction, represents substantial progress towards maritime dispute settlement in the Bay of
Bengal. The Tribunal’s adoption of the same three-stage process pioneered in the Black Sea
Case, is to be commended as enhancing the consistency and predictability in judicial
decisions relating to maritime boundary delimitation.
That said, there remain some problematic aspects to the Tribunal’s Judgment, notably
in respect of selectivity regarding the choice of basepoints to construct the provisional
delimitation line and therefore in the application of the three-stage process and regarding the
circumstances deemed relevant to delimitation within and beyond the 200nm limit. Further,
the Tribunal has left Bangladesh and Myanmar, however, with potentially challenging
jurisdictional issues, and thus grey clouds on the horizon, to resolve between themselves.
Given the decision and the looming matter of the maritime boundary between India and
Bangladesh,45 the Tribunal’s decision nonetheless offers hope of clearer skies regarding what
approach parties can expect from an international judicial body deliberating on boundaries in
the Bay of Bengal, even if some potentially troublesome grey clouds remain.

45

Bangladesh v. India, Permanent Court of Arbitration, 2009, http://www.pca-cpa.org/showpage. asp?pag_ id =
1376..
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